Voluntary disclosure theory predicts that an optimal disclosure decision should produce an overall net benefit for shareholders, and that such net benefit should decrease in public information availability. This study supports the predictions of disclosure theory in the context of climate change. Using voluntary disclosures made through the CSR newswire service, we find that managers' disclosure decisions involving greenhouse gas emissions produce positive returns to shareholders. This response varies negatively with company size and public information availability. For small companies in a limited public information environment, we find that mean adjusted share price increases significantly by 2.32 percent over days -2 to 2 around the CSR newswire release date. Our sample of disclosing companies received an aggregate market value boost from their CSR newswire releases of approximately ten billion dollars, independent of differences in public information availability.
Introduction
Growing awareness of climate change has led to increased demands from individuals, advocacy groups, and government regulators for companies to provide additional information about their climate change strategies and plans for managing and reducing carbon emissions.
These demands have resulted in companies allocating increased resources to communicating information about their carbon footprint to interested parties. Although users will soon have access to standardized carbon emissions data collected by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2009 ) and the California Air Resources Board (CARB 2010) , companies currently report most of their green information to interested parties voluntarily, either directly or through various non-governmental channels. Voluntary disclosure theory suggests that companies should make disclosure decisions in the best interests of shareholders, net of the costs of disclosure such as agency costs, proprietary disadvantage (Verrecchia 1983 , Diamond and Verrecchia 1991 , Lambert et al. 2007 , and outsiders' knowledge of information uncertainty (Dye 1985) . Voluntary disclosure theory also suggests that the net benefits of additional disclosure to shareholders should depend on the firm's information environment, in particular, the level of information available to outside shareholders. For example, when outside shareholders' information availability is low, the theory predicts a new disclosure about company activities should elicit more price response as traders look to benefit from the heretofore private information. On the other hand, a new disclosure should yield less price response when outside information availability is high, as traders have already priced into the stock their greater knowledge about company activities from competitive sources. Yohn (1998) confirms this prediction in the context of earnings announcements and finds that companies with less (more) public information availability yield stronger (weaker) price reactions to earnings. Similarly, Freeman (1987) finds that smaller (larger) companies' shares respond more (less) around earnings announcements, reasoning that small-stock traders have higher per share information costs than large-stock traders. This leads to reduced public information availability for smaller companies, which increases the sensitivity of share price to new information.
In this study, we test the preceding propositions in the context of climate change disclosures and posit that shareholders should respond positively to voluntary climate change disclosures consistent with the net benefits intended by the disclosure, and that such response should vary with outside shareholders' (public) information availability. We capture the overall net benefit to the company as an increase in shareholder value, as shareholders' expectations interpreted broadly should embrace the business profit and the environmental and social consequences of managers' disclosure decisions; and we proxy for public information availability using company size and financial analyst variables. Our results are intended to contribute to a growing empirical literature (reviewed in section 2) on shareholders' recognition of and response to climate change disclosures.
Company managers should be informed about the overall effects of their disclosure decisions; and shareholders, analysts, and investment managers should understand the shareholder valuation implications of companies' climate change disclosures.
Specifically, we examine shareholders' response to a unique set of disclosures about climate change made by U.S. companies through the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) newswire service. We study the CSR newswire service for several reasons. First, companies' CSR releases meet the criteria of a voluntary disclosure. Companies decide on the content, timing, and dissemination (CSR in this case) of a disclosure. Second, CSR newswire claims to be the global leader in disseminating news about corporate social responsibility and sustainability, currently with one-quarter of one million page views every month. This enables us to study a large sample of disclosures over several years for a wide range of industries made through a single channel. To further strengthen our tests, we restrict our analysis to CSR releases about greenhouse gas (GHG) or carbon emissions, as recent evidence across Australia, Canada, and the United States (Chapple et al. 2011 , Griffin et al. 2011 , Matsumura et al. 2011 concludes that shareholders find GHG emissions as value relevant and price them as an off-balance sheet liability; whereas the literature reports sparse evidence on responses to other categories of non-financial disclosure, possibly because the content of such is more varied and the implications less clear. Eccles et al. (2011) also support this view based on the number of user hits from Bloomberg. They document that, of the many non-financial measures available to investors, information-intensive institutional investors such as hedge fund managers and sell-side analysts have the highest demand for GHG emissions amounts and environmental disclosure quality scores. Our results also contribute to a developing literature on newswires in general, and how they aid in price discovery in capital markets (Li and Ramesh 2010).
Third, CSR newswire conveys fresh information to users (see note 2), also a critical aspect of our research design. This differs from recent studies that rely on survey data, such as from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). While CDP is another leading source of GHG data, investors and others receive information on large companies' emissions at best some nine to ten months after year end, by which time other channels, including CSR newswire, may have preempted much of the news content of that information. An alternative is to study companies' 8-K filings, as in Griffin et al. (2011) . While 8-Ks reveal timely and potentially significant news because the filer has a regulatory obligation to disclose promptly and to meet a materiality threshold, evidence of a shareholder response to an 8-K does not imply that shareholders benefit from a voluntary disclosure, which is the purpose of this analysis. In fact, in the case of emission-intensive companies, the evidence suggests that 8-K climate change disclosures trigger a negative reaction on the average, inconsistent with the intended stock market outcome of a voluntary disclosure.
To summarize, our study adds to the literature by examining whether shareholders benefit when companies make decisions to disclose climate change information voluntarily, in our case, through the CSR newswire service. We view fact-based analysis of companies' voluntary disclosure decisions as an essential element of the climate change disclosure debate, which thus far has focused disproportionately on users' demands for additional information absent evidence that would buttress those demands (e.g., Coburn et al. 2011) . To the best of our knowledge, the following results relating to the market effects of voluntary disclosures about carbon emissions are unique to the literature.
Our study first confirms the theoretical proposition that companies disclose voluntary climate change information in the interests of shareholders by documenting a significantly positive response to CSR newswire releases involving GHG emissions in the three day interval around the disclosure date. Second, our study finds that this response varies negatively with company size and public information availability. This result supports our second proposition that voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions data benefits companies more in environments with low public information availability. These results are also unchanged when we assess shareholder response in different ways, namely, stock return in excess of a market index, stock return relative to a nonevent period, stock return relative to a matched sample of non-discloser companies, and stock return from a Fama and French (1993) four-factor model that controls for market return in excess of the risk free rate, company size, growth, and stock price momentum. We also challenge our results by testing whether a portfolio that is long (short) in companies with low (high) public information availability might earn a significant hedge portfolio return from possible mispricing.
We find no evidence to suggest that investors exploit differences in companies' information environment to earn positive hedge fund returns, which is another way of understanding that investors recognize the benefits of climate change disclosures efficiently with an appropriate adjustment in shareholder value based on public information availability, although measurement error could also explain this result. Finally, our results send a statistically reliable "it pays to be green" message to managers about the compatibility of green disclosure and shareholder value maximization. The discloser companies in our study received an aggregate boost in market value from their CSR newswire releases of approximately ten billion dollars, independent of differences in public information availability calculated as the sum over all CSR releases of the market value of stock i at CSR release day t-1 times the excess stock return on day 0.
Our study proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 summarizes the results of testing for a market response, and section 5 concludes.
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Related literature
We first discuss disclosure theory, as this helps us understand the objectives and expected consequences of voluntary disclosure for company shareholders. Verrecchia (1983) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) inter alia predict that disclosure decisions by managers should be valueenhancing for shareholders and part of a strategy that optimally trades off the benefits to shareholders against the costs to the company, where those costs include out-of-pocket costs, agency costs, litigation risk, and proprietary disadvantage. Others argue that a beneficial disclosure strategy should be value-enhancing through a reduction in the cost of capital (Lambert et al. 2007) or information asymmetry (Mensah et al. 2003) , although others (e.g., Akins et al. 2011 , Armstrong et al. 2011 contend that a reduction in the information component of cost of capital has limited impact on shares traded in competitive stock markets such as the NYSE and NASDAQ.
Disclosure theory also considers the effects of adverse selection (Grossman and Hart 1980) and the prediction that shareholders in a voluntary disclosure setting who know that managers have private information may interpret the absence of a disclosure negatively compared to an otherwise similar company disclosure that reveals positive news. While it is beyond the scope of our study to examine otherwise identical non-disclosers, our design checks for possible non-discloser effects by analyzing the returns of a matched sample of non-discloser companies around the disclosure dates of otherwise similar discloser companies.
Disclosure theory should also apply in the context of CSR newswire disclosures about climate change, because even though the objectives of green disclosure relate to business profit and broader considerations such as environmental and social goals, the intended consequences of meeting those goals are ultimately the same, namely, improved shareholder expectations about company performance and future cash flows. However, given the newness of the context and investors' changing views on corporate environmental and social responsibility, how climate change information links to shareholder value may be more difficult to detect relative to traditional financial statement measures such as earnings, although this mostly poses a design challenge.
Overall, this literature predicts that companies will disclose voluntarily only when it is worthwhile to do so net of disclosure costs. This suggests a positive impact on shareholders (or a non-negative effect at a minimum), which is our first proposition.
Disclosure theory further posits that managers condition their disclosure decisions and strategies on attributes of the information environment. In capital markets with high public information availability (and low information asymmetry) investors update their beliefs about companies' prospects frequently and promptly, based on multiple channels of information, so that current prices reflect relatively well-formed expectations about future returns. In this setting, news elicits a limited price response, as much is known already through the other channels. In contrast, prices will be more responsive in an information environment with less frequent disclosure from fewer sources, assuming investor sophistication and information quality unchanged. Voluntary disclosure in such setting should therefore elicit a greater price response as investors update their uncertain expectations in response to the new information.
Empirical studies by Freeman (1987) and Yohn (1998) confirm the notion that stock price response differs on the basis of public information availability, although this is primarily in the context of earnings announcements. Freeman (1987) proxies for public information availability using company size, and Yohn (1998) uses analyst following and size as the proxies for public information availability. This relation also occurs in the context of mandated disclosures about climate change in regulatory filings, wherein Griffin et al. (2011) find that more emission-intensive companies elicit less investor response than less-emission intensive companies around the 8-K filing date because the former group's shares trade in a richer information environment (as proxied by company size and the CDP disclosure quality score). Overall these studies support our second testable proposition -that shareholders' response to a voluntary CSR newswire disclosure should vary negatively with proxies for the level of public information availability.
Our study also builds upon a second stream of literature that relates green information to shareholder value. By showing an association between stock prices and an attribute of a green disclosure that varies across companies, several studies extrapolate this result to infer that shareholders use this information to set prices. By documenting significant associations between shareholder value or cost of capital and voluntary environmental or climate change disclosures, these studies support the inference that share prices adjust appropriately to green information conditional on an attribute of that information; such as the type (Hughes 2000) , quality (Plumlee et al. 2008) , and timing (Dhaliwal et al. 2010 ) of the disclosure.
More recently, Chapple et al. (2011 ), Griffin et al. (2011 ), and Matsumura et al. (2011 document a negative association between GHG emissions reported to the CDP and shareholder value, and conclude that investors price carbon emissions as an undisclosed off-balance sheet liability. Cormier and Magnan (1997) also document that investors price implicit environmental liabilities through reports on water pollution. Griffin et al. (2011) further contend and find that companies that do not report emissions to the CDP also show a negative relation between estimated GHG emissions and stock price, consistent with the fact that the CDP is only one of many channels of information about companies' carbon emissions. These studies, however, mostly document cross-sectional associations between stock price or cost of capital and an environmental or climate change disclosure variable rather than a response that flows directly from the disclosure event per se.
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A related set of studies examines the stock price response to environmental or climate change disclosures using a design similar to this paper. The focus of these studies, however, differs from the present paper, since the earlier papers address investors' response to company disclosures about one-off events. These include the Bhopal disaster (Blacconiere and Patten 1994), the passage of Superfund legislation (Blacconiere and Northcutt 1997), the Exxon oil spill (Patten and Nance 1998), the Placer Dome accident (Magness 2010), and the first-time issuance of a corporate sustainability report (Guidry and Patten 2010) . Other studies examine environmental disclosures in financial reports (Murray et al. 2006 , Jones et al. 2007 ).
With the possible exception of Guidry and Patten (2010) , who find no market reaction to the issuance of an initial sustainability report by Australian companies, none of the events and/or disclosures studied so far would seem purely voluntary by the company. This absence of evidence about the consequences of specific, company-initiated, voluntary disclosures about climate change is surprising given that most advocates of increased green disclosure premise their argument on the expectation rather than the fact of a shareholder or company benefit from such disclosure (e.g., Coburn et al. 2011 ). The present study addresses this knowledge gap by using a unique data set of green disclosures made voluntarily by U.S. companies through the CSR newswire service.
1 Another stream of literature investigates relations between environmental performance and environmental disclosure, arguing that environmental performance should influence the amount and quality of environmental disclosure. It is unclear from this literature, though, whether better environmental performers are better voluntary disclosers or worse voluntary disclosers. For example, Clarkson et al. (2011a) find a positive relation between environmental performance and disclosure based on a sample of Canadian companies. On the other hand, Clarkson et al. (2011b) find that pollution-intensive companies in Australia disclose more and better (more objective) information than their less pollution-intensive counterparts. Also,
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Sample and data
We select the CSR newswire sample by searching all archived releases in www.csrwire.com as of December 31, 2010 that contain the phrases "greenhouse gas emissions", "carbon emissions", or "CO 2 emissions", hereafter, collectively, GHG releases. This initial search identifies 575 GHG releases from a total of 18,588 CSR releases over 2000 through 2010. We then eliminate those that do not relate to a specific company (48 releases Next, we select a matched control sample following a four-step process. The first step creates a merged data set from Compustat and IBES that includes all company-year observations in years 2000 through 2010 with data for total assets (at from Compustat) and the number of analysts following the company as of the end of each year (numest from IBES). In the second step, we select a matching company from the merged Compustat/IBES data set for each company in the CSR sample such that the company (a) is in the same sector as the CSR company (gsector from Compustat) and (b) minimizes the sum of squares of the absolute difference in log of total assets and number of analysts following in the year of the first CSR press release, that is, we choose a matching company that minimizes (Log at matched -Log at CSR We use the matched sample to control for the shareholder returns of an otherwise similar sample with the closest asset and analyst forecast attributes. The use of a matched set of pseudo release dates also checks for possible information transfer effects, which could be positive if the CSR disclosure conveys favorable industry (gsector) information or negative, for example, due to a possible adverse selection effect under the strict assumption that investors view the matched sample companies as those than could have made a GHG emission disclosure on the same day as the CSR company but chose not to do so.
Panel C of table 1 shows the distribution of industries and the mean asset size of each industry.
As the panel shows, each industry matches well on size, and our sample is reasonably diverse across the sectors, although the financial and energy sectors represent the most frequent number of observations, and industrials and materials sectors represent the least frequent. In the later analysis, we assess whether differences in these observation frequencies have an impact on our statistical tests. exceeds the mean market-adjusted return for the matched sample, and (c) exceeds the mean market-adjusted return for the CSR sample over a non-announcement interval (days -20 to 20, excluding days -1 to 1). We define market-adjusted return for company i as the common stock return on day t less the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index. As predicted, we find that shareholders on average respond positively to a CSR newswire release, by 0.468 percent over the three day window. This amount is significantly different from zero based on a one-tailed t test (p-value = 0.042). We also find that the mean excess return from days -1 to 1 is significantly higher than the mean market-adjusted return over a non-announcement period (p-value = 0.027).
Furthermore, the market-adjusted return for the CSR sample over the event period is significantly higher than the return for the matched sample (p-value = 0.098). We detect no significant response for the matched sample around the pseudo release date that corresponds to the release date of the CSR company. Hence, independent of company size or public information availability, the tests in panel A document a small but reliably positive shareholder response to a CSR newswire release.
Panel B of table 3 documents a significantly positive response using a multi-factor approach.
We use the Fama and French (1993) four-factor model for this purpose and conduct the following regression:
where t refers to days -1 to 1, R t is the stock return on day t, rf t is the risk-free rate (measured as the one month Treasury bill rate); RMRF t (excess market factor) is the return of the value-weighted stock market portfolio minus the return on the one month Treasury bill; SMB t HML t and MOM t are portfolio returns on zero-investment, factor-mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market equity, and stock return momentum, respectively; and e is the residual error. The intercept or alpha coefficient in the regression tests for an announcement effect after controlling for market return in excess of the risk free rate, company size, growth, and a momentum factor. Panel B reports a positive and significant alpha coefficient for this regression for the CSR sample (coef. = 0.00153, p-value = 0.075, robust standard error). Because of differences in industry composition ( Next, to strengthen this initial result, we examine whether shareholders' response in the CSR announcement interval varies with an attribute of the information environment. This makes it more likely that the response relates to the climate change release and not an unrelated information item.
In proposition 2, we predict a more positive response for smaller companies and companies that trade in an environment with less public information availability. We proxy for public information availability in three ways, namely, the number of analysts following the stock, absolute value of analysts' earnings forecasts errors, and standard deviation in analysts' earnings forecast (Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995 , Chung et al. 1995 , Yohn 1998 , Hong et al. 2000 , Frankel and Li 2004 , Zhang 2006 . Because size can also be a systematic risk factor priced by investors to reflect return uncertainty, we concentrate on excess stock returns using the Fama and French (1993) model before partitioning on analyst forecast variables hypothesized to reflect public information availability, although we present results based on market-adjusted returns as well. Table 4 present results partitioned by large and small company size and high and low information availability. We summarize the key results as follows. First, large companies do not show mean excess return over days -1 to 1 that is significantly greater than zero, the mean excess return over days -20 to 20 excluding days -1 to 1, or the mean excess return for the matched sample.
Small companies, on the other hand, show significantly greater mean excess return over days -1 to 1 for all three significance benchmarks. The mean excess return difference between the large and small companies is also significant at less than 5 percent (p-value= 0.031).
Second, for companies with greater analyst coverage, and therefore high public information availability, we show that the mean excess return over days -1 to 1 is marginally significant for two significance tests (i.e., p-value = 0.091 when we test the mean excess return against zero, and pvalue = 0.062 when we test the mean excess return against the return over the non-event period).
The mean excess return over days -1 to 1, however, is not significantly different from the return for the matched sample. For companies with less available public information, we find that the mean excess return over days -1 to 1 is significant for all three significance tests. However, the return difference between the high and low information availability companies is not statistically significant.
Third, when we compare the mean excess return for the extreme groups of small companies with low public information availability and large companies with high public information availability, we show that the former experience a strong positive stock reaction over event days -1 to 1. Overall, these results support our second proposition that voluntary disclosure benefits companies more in environments with low public information availability.
Panel B of table 4 summarizes the alpha coefficients from a Fama and French (1993) fourfactor model estimated over CSR release days -1 to 1, partitioned on company size and number of analysts following. First, similar to the results in panel A, in most tests, we find no significant alpha coefficients for large or high information availability companies. But we observe positive and significant alpha for both small and low information availability companies. Second, for the two extreme groups, we observe a positive and significant alpha for companies with low information availability/low size, and a positive but insignificant alpha for companies with high information availability/high size. Third, the table shows insignificant t-statistics for excess stock returns over days -20 to 20, excluding days -1 to 1, thus indicating essentially zero returns over these days. Over days -2 to 2, the CSR group increases by 2.32 percent whereas the matched group decreases by 1.63 percent (and both these five-day excess returns are significantly different from zero). Also, beyond day 2, we observe no sign of a price reversal for the CSR sample. Overall, the evidence in table 4 confirms our second proposition that shareholders respond to CSR disclosures conditional on public information availability.
Second, we partition the sample into size and information availability terciles to check for a monotonic relation between shareholder response and size or information availability. Table 5 summarizes the results of estimating a Fama and French (1993) Third, we add size (Log at) and/or number of analysts (numest) to the Fama and French (1993) four-factor model and report the results in table 6. This table shows that both additional factors vary negatively with shareholders' response (regressions 1 and 2). Regressions 1 and 2 also document positive and significant alphas, consistent with an overall significant response after controlling for size and public information availability (similar to panel B of table 3). Both factors together (regression 3) also significantly explain shareholders' response (based on the incremental R 2 from the two variables combined), but none is significant individually in that regression. In addition, regressions 4-6 show that none of the additional factors is significant for the matched sample of pseudo release dates.
As a final analysis, we compute the zero investment hedge portfolio return by the calculating the three-month compounded stock return before CSR release day 0 and after CSR release day 0 for portfolios based on size quintiles and three information availability terciles (number of analysts, standard deviation of analysts' forecasts, standard deviation of analysts' forecast error). We then test for a non-zero return on a portfolio that is long in size quintile 1 (smallest) and short in size quintile 5 (largest) and long in information availability tercile 3 (least) and short in information uncertainly tercile 3 (most) in the three months before and after CSR release date. In unreported results, we find that seven of the eight hedge portfolios (four metrics times two time periods) generate returns that are virtually indistinguishable from zero. This supports the view that stock prices adjust appropriately around the CSR release dates for differences in public information availability related to size or analyst forecast attributes, since otherwise the hedge portfolio returns would be significantly different from zero, and potentially a source of arbitrage trading profits.
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Conclusions
This study adds to the literature on the relevance to capital market participants of green information by documenting shareholders' response to companies' voluntary disclosures about GHG emissions made through the CSR newswire service (an organization that claims to be the global leader in climate change disclosure). Our evidence is important because managers should understand the risks and consequences of their green disclosure decisions to outside parties, whose demands have risen substantially in recent years due to heightened concerns about climate change.
A more fundamental contribution of our study relates to tests of voluntary disclosure theory in the context of climate change, where the theory predicts that an optimal disclosure decision should (a) produce an overall net benefit for shareholders and (b) that such net benefit should decrease in public information availability. To date, the empirical literature yields little to support the predictions of voluntary disclosure theory in the context of climate change, possibly because managers face a myriad of additional challenges and uncertainties in making optimal climate change disclosures. For instance, too much climate change disclosure could increase proprietary disadvantage and litigation and insurance costs; whereas too little could trigger adverse selection problems, increase information asymmetry, and raise the cost of capital. Changing and uncertain views about the appropriate balance of companies' profit and environmental and social goals further complicate a voluntary green disclosure decision. So it is unclear that we would observe empirical results for voluntary climate change disclosures consistent with the theory (and with findings in other settings).
Our study generates two new results regarding companies' voluntary disclosures about GHG emissions. First, our evidence shows that managers' voluntary green disclosure decisions produce positive returns to shareholders. This means that we can reasonably infer that managers' green disclosure decisions reflect an appropriate balance of the costs and benefits of disclosure, since the theory also posits that too much or too little disclosure can be harmful to the company. Second, we find that shareholders of smaller companies with limited public information availability benefit the most from voluntary green disclosure, since in this setting investors have fewer other channels and less access to competing information. For instance, for small companies in a limited public information environment, mean adjusted share price increases significantly, by 2.32 percent over days -2 to 2 around the CSR release date. Shareholders of large companies also benefit from voluntary green disclosure but less significantly, as their larger size attracts more attention from financial analysts and others whose analysis preempts some of the value of the additional disclosure.
As part of our research design, we also check whether an investor could exploit differences in shareholder response from differences in public information availability to earn an abnormal hedge portfolio return. We construct a portfolio that is long (short) in companies with low (high) information availability and test for a significant hedge portfolio abnormal return over three months before and/or three months after the CSR disclosure. We find no evidence of an abnormal hedge portfolio return over these intervals, which is another way to conclude that investors recognize the benefits of climate change disclosures efficiently and without bias, although measurement error could explain this result.
Also, as part of our research design, we compare the adjusted share price response of CSR releases with the response of a matched sample of non-CSR companies on the same day. We find no similar response for the matched sample as a whole, although the mean adjusted price of the matched sample of small companies with low public information availability decreases around CSR release date, which could be an information transfer effect, although we leave a thorough investigation of such effects in the context of climate change disclosures to future research.
As a closing thought, we find our affirmative "it pays to be green" result interesting and encouraging, as shareholders' overall positive response to companies' voluntary green disclosures bodes well for the future, since shareholders, regulators, and others will surely place even greater demands on companies for additional disclosure and transparency regarding climate change impacts and strategies. So far, management appears to be making optimal voluntary disclosure decisions in this regard. Panel A plots the cumulative mean market-adjusted excess return for the CSR smallest size/least public information availability portfolio and the equivalent matched sample portfolio, cumulated over days -10 to 10 (table 4 tests for a significant response over days -1 to 1).
2 Panel B graphs the Fama and French (1993) four-factor model alpha coefficients from table 5, panel A (CSR sample by size) and panel C (CSR sample by public information availability). The intercept coefficients estimate the announcement effect over days -1 to 1 for each partition after controlling for market return in excess of the risk free rate (RMRF) and the portfolio returns on zero-investment, factor-mimicking portfolios for company size (SMB), growth (HML), and stock momentum (MOM).
-2.00% - This table summarizes the coefficients and tests of significance from a Fama and French (1993) four-factor model estimated over each sample as a cross-sectional regression over CSR release days or a matched sample pseudo release days -1 to 1, partitioned on three groups of company size (larger, middle, smaller) and three groups of public information availability based on number of IBES analysts following the stock (less, middle, more). The intercept coefficients or alphas in the regressions test for an announcement effect for each partition after controlling for market return in excess of the risk free rate (RMRF) and the portfolio returns on zero-investment, factor-mimicking portfolios for company size (SMB), growth (HML), and stock momentum (MOM). ** indicates significant at less than 5%. 
